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Infrastructure in South Africa:  
Who is to finance and who is to pay?
∗ 










Against  the  backdrop  of  shifting  views  on  the  role  of  government  in  the  provision  of 
infrastructure, this paper distinguishes between the payment for and financing of the South 
African  Government’s  infrastructure  investment  programme.  The  paper  also  presents  a 
classification  system  that  enables  a  systematic  mapping  of  all  prospective  projects,  with 
reference  to  considerations  of  efficiency  and  equity.  This  mapping  should  assist  in  macro 
planning and in any analysis of the financial implications of project financing and cost recovery 
at all levels of government. The government’s financing strategy is questioned and alternatives 
are identified. The prospects for mobilising funds other than tax revenue are assessed, namely 
government  loans,  private  equity,  development  finance  and  donor  funds.  Four  investment 
projects  are  considered  with  a  view  to  testing  the  classification  system  and  evaluating  the 
chosen financing options in terms of economic criteria. 
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Infrastructure in South Africa: 
Who is to finance and who is to pay? 
 
In terms of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) (RSA, 2006), 
the 2006 National Budget envisaged that R415,8 billion will be invested in infrastructure over a 
three-year period (National Treasury, 2007: 45). This investment surge is to follow the previous 
period of major cutbacks in public-sector investment
1, an important though not undisputed factor in 
the  successful  decade-long  attempt  at  restoring  fiscal  sustainability.  A  breakdown  by  year  and 
expenditure entity is given in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
National government financed infrastructure expenditure estimates, 
2007/08 – 2009/10 









National government  5 783  6 908  7 766  20 457 
Provincial government  35 383  41 561  42 203  119 147 
Municipalities  28 214  32 413  33 537  94 164 
Public-private partnerships
1)  3 458  5 197  4 160  12 815 
Extra-budgetary public entities  5 298  5 608  6 385  17 291 
General Government  78 136  91 687  94 051  263 874 
Budget balance (+ = saving; - 
= borrowing) 
16 659  3 910  -1 450  19 119 
Infrastructure tax financed  78 136  91 687  92 601  262 424 
Non-financial  government 
enterprises 
44 681  50 324  56 929  151 934 
Total  122 817  142 011  150 980  415 808 
Source:   National Treasury (2007: chapter 3). 
Notes:  1) Capital expenditure on PPPs overseen by the Treasury PPP Unit, SA National Roads Agency, Department 
of Public Works and at municipal level. PPP's only reflect private sector contributions. 
 
The pivotal role accorded to public investment in ASGISA raises questions that during the past two 
decades  have  generated  increasing  research  interest  in  infrastructure  and  its  proper  financing. 
Research is concerned with questions such as: what are the financing needs of infrastructure; how 
much scope is there for private participation in infrastructure financing; how much fiscal space do 
governments have to meet infrastructure financing needs; and what should drive the new wave of 
financing mechanisms? (Estache, 2004: 7). In many respects these questions boil down to two 
important questions: how is this infrastructure expansion to be financed and who is eventually to 
pay? 
 
We are reminded that the answers to these two questions are not only important for reasons of 
allocative and technical efficiency, but also because of certain distinctive economic characteristics 
of infrastructure – a high capital intensity, externalities, elements of natural monopoly, and location-
specific investments – all of which affect the nature and extent of government involvement and 
private sector incentives to commit long-term capital (World Bank, 2006: 150). 
 
Table 1 implies that 63.4 per cent of the envisaged investment during the three-year period will be 
financed by the three tiers of government collectively known as the general government. Of the 
total  of  general  government  investment,  almost  R140bn  will  be  undertaken  by  national  and 
provincial government. Government (RSA 2007: 3) predicts a main budget surplus of 0.3 per cent 
                                                       
1 The general government’s contribution to gross capital formation, which had reached its highest post-1960 level of 10,6 
per cent in 1976, then decreased steadily, reaching a low of 2,4 per cent in 1992 and remaining low during the 1990s. 
Only during the first half of the current decade were there signs of a turnaround. During 2000-2004 general government 
capital formation averaged 2,8 per cent of GDP, with indications of a further upward trend towards the end of the period. 
In addition, persistent (albeit decreasing) general government dissaving reduced the pool of savings that is available for 
investment to expand the productive capacity of the economy. See Calitz and Siebrits (2005: 255).  
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in 2006/07 and 0.6 per cent in 2007/08, moving to deficits of 0.1 per cent in 2008/09 and 0.4 per 
cent in 2009/10. Given that virtually no borrowing occurs within provinces, this implies that the 
infrastructure will on balance be financed by current revenue (tax income). The investment by non-
financial  enterprises  will  be  financed  through  non-tax  income.  It  is  unclear  whether  municipal 
infrastructure will be financed through intergovernmental transfers, local taxes or user charges. 
 
This likely scenario raises a few questions. Why  would the Government pay in cash (i.e.  use 
current tax revenue) for infrastructural investment, which has a long economic lifetime and of which 
the benefits arguably straddles more than one generation of tax payers? What other options are 
available and what are their advantages and disadvantages? 
 
Towards an understanding of the Government’s infrastructure financing strategy 
 
The Government’s short-term macroeconomic strategy apparently inter alia aims at softening the 
risks associated with the relatively high current account deficit. Fiscal restraint in the form of a 
balanced budget or even a surplus is a key element. The aim clearly is to neutralise the inflationary 
consequences of high domestic spending and current account pressures on the external value of 
the home currency. The high import content of much of the envisaged infrastructural investment 
and  the  scarcity  predicted  for  certain  inputs  and  skills  are  likely  to  add  further  cost  pressures 
(SUDEO International Business Consultants, 2007: iii-iv). The longer-term objective apparently is to 
increase the national propensity to save: the financing of the envisaged national and provincial 
infrastructural investment within a balanced budget should directly increase the savings rate by 
about 2.6 percentage points. 
 
The  above  approach  can  be  questioned  from  different  angles.  Economic  theory  suggests  two 
reasons for financing infrastructure through loans, rather than taxes. They are intergenerational 
equity and the associated application of the benefit principle for purposes of allocative efficiency, 
and  Keynesian  activism  for  purposes  of  macroeconomic  stabilisation.  The  strongest  arguments 
against  loans  are  the  neoclassical  argument  of  crowding-out  and  the  public  choice  leviathan 
argument. In recent times fiscal rules have gained popularity as a reaction to the disillusion with 
fiscal discretion, even though it has been argued that fiscal rules are unlikely to add credibility 
benefits to fiscal discretion cum transparency-enhancing measures (Siebrits and Calitz, 2003: 781). 
Standard fiscal rules adopted to ensure debt sustainability as part of macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes  are  increasingly  being  criticized,  however,  as  excessively  binding  constraints  on 
appropriate  countercyclical  action  (Estache,  2004:  13).  To  the  extent  that  the  South  African 
Government  has  reduced  the  budget  balance  below  the  levels  required  for  macroeconomic 
stability, underutilised fiscal space exists.
2 This would allow for at least two other fiscal options or a 
combination thereof, without incurring government dissaving. The Government could resort to loan 
finance that matches the total annual capital spending, which will enable the launching of more 
projects than under cash financing. Another option would be to reduce the tax burden. 
 
We now explore the financing of infrastructure from an allocative and distributional point of view. 
 
The Government’s financing strategy implies the application of the ability-to-pay approach, which 
severs the link between the user of the infrastructure and the person or entity who pays for it. 
Moreover, the strategy implies that a major part of the infrastructure has to be financed via the 
budgets of the three tiers of government. This raises two related questions: should government be 
the financier and should tax payers foot the bill? The first question has to do with the assignment of 
responsibilities  for  the  financing  of  infrastructure  in  a  market-based  economy  (i.e.  are  the 
infrastructural facilities public goods?); the second with the appropriate incidence of the cost. 
 
Table 2 allows for an inspection of the type of infrastructure to be supplied. It shows that economic 
infrastructure  constitutes  almost  80  per  cent  (see  subtotal  1)  of  the  total  of  the  expenditure 
estimates which the Government identified as key capital/infrastructure. If housing is added, the 
ratio is almost 90 per cent (see subtotal 2). The cost of all of these can arguably be recouped from 
individual end users, rather than tax payers, by applying the benefit principle rather than the ability-
                                                       
2 For a discussion of the nature of fiscal space in relation to fiscal sustainability, see Heller (2005b).  
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to-pay principle.  
 
Table 2 
Key capital/infrastructure expenditure estimates, 2003/04 – 2009/10 




Water (DWAF, water boards, TCTA and municipal)  27.3  9.0 
Sanitation (municipal and DWAF)  9.5  3.2 
Electricity (Eskom and municipal)  71.3  23.5 
Roads (SANRAL, provincial and municipal)  62.2  20.5 
Rail (SARCC, Gautrain and Spoornet)  46.1  15.2 
Ports (NPA and SAPO)  16.6  5.5 
Sport & Recreation (World Cup stadiums)  7.8  2.6 
  Subtotal 1  240.5  79.5 
Housing (housing developments)  29.6  9.8 
  Subtotal 2  270.1  89.3 
Education (school building)  11.6  3.8 
Health (hospitals and clinics)  16.3  5.4 
Justice (courts )  1.3  0.4 
Police  3.3  1.1 
Total  302.8  100.0 
Source:  National Treasury (2007: 45). 
 
Alternatives or supplements to the Government’s choice 
 
From an efficiency point of view, the traditional view as to whether and to what extent government 
should  assume  responsibility  for  the  provision  (read:  financing)  of  public  goods  has  shifted 
substantially  over  the  past  few  decades.  Infrastructure  provides  public  services  and  therefore 
assumes some kind of public sector involvement. Three types of market failures are relevant to 
infrastructure provision – public goods (goods with the usual characteristics of non-rivalry and non-
excludability), externalities (marginal private benefit is smaller than the marginal social benefit) and 
incomplete  markets  (of  which  natural  monopolies  with  decreasing  average  costs  are  the  best 
example).  Each  requires  different  ways  of  government  intervention:  pure  public  goods  require 
government  to  prompt  the  process  and  incur  the  cost  of  provision,  while  externalities  and 
incomplete  markets  may  require  government  in  a  more  regulatory  role.  It  is  important  that  a 
government  does  not  assume  an  inappropriate  role,  nor  expects  inappropriate  involvement  of 
private  business,  a  balancing  of  responsibilities  and  associated  risk  incidence  which  is  easily 
misjudged and which could jeopardize the outcome. 
 
Different market failures also necessitate different methods of budgeting and means of financing. 
Traditionally, pure public goods (such as street lights, highways and water storage) are financed by 
government  through  present  or  future  taxation,  with  no  or  partial  user  charge  cost  recovery. 
Positive externalities and natural monopolies create opportunities for benefit taxation through user 
charges or earmarked taxes, with or without government or private loan finance, while the use of 
private  equity  occurs  where  private-public  partnerships  are  found  in  natural  monopolies,  as 
increasingly happens. 
 
Of  course,  the  respective  roles  of  government  and  private  business  are  shifting  with  changing 
technology and innovation. Figure 1 is an attempt to illustrate that the traditional public finance 
view, in terms of which little if any infrastructure provision was seen to be provided by the market, 
has shifted to a view which accords a bigger responsibility to the market. The ICT revolution, the 
development of competitive markets and a better understanding of different ways in which market 
competition can be simulated, played a role.  
 
Examples  abound:  in  electricity  generation,  the  advancement  of  solar-  and  wind-powered 
generators  are  shifting  electricity  production  from  the  traditional  viewpoint  towards  private 
ownership and management, a move brought about by lower fixed costs and smaller economies of 
scale. In telecommunications, cellular technology has all but removed the natural monopoly fixed-
line operator while new privately operated ports and airports show that innovative market design  
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Shifting view on the publicness of infrastructure 
 
 
Source: The authors 
 
 
More importantly, the shift towards rival and excludable infrastructure goods has also reshaped the 
traditional view of infrastructure financing. Figure 1 shows that because excludability has increased 
and rivalry can be simulated to a greater degree, the ability to determine a price (user charge) has 
gained  field  on  taxation.  Consequently,  a  much  larger  range  of  goods  and  services  (including 
infrastructure) traditionally classified as tax-financed public goods, are now regarded as “priceable” 
self-financing activities within or outside of government budgets. This is depicted by an expansion 
of  the  “infrastructure      ellipse”  in  Figure  1,  towards  the  top  (indicating  a  greater  measure  of 
excludability)  and  to  the  right  (more  rivalry);  in  combination  this  implies  greater  private  sector 
involvement. Of course, a change in the finance mechanism also has distributional implications, to 
which we refer later. 
 
The South African Government has apparently decided to use taxes to finance a major part of the 
planned  infrastructure  investment,  in  contrast  with  other  possibilities  suggested  by  current 
mainstream economic thinking and international experience. We suggest that one way to identify 
the alternatives is with reference to the different organisational forms in which public infrastructure 
might be provided. 
￿  If the activity forms part of the functions of a national, provincial or local government and is 
financed (in cash) within the annual budget, the financing will be effected either through 
reprioritisation, additional taxes or loan finance. In the case of loan finance, the loan is likely 
to be serviced through future tax revenue and/or user charges. Multilateral development 
finance may be a supplementary source. 
￿  If the activity is the responsibility of a designated government agency other than a normal 
government  department  (e.g.  a  water  board,  a  public  enterprise  such  as  Transnet  or  a 
public  corporation  such  as  Eskom),  internal  financing  (if  accumulated  reserves  are 
available) and external financing (loans or equity) – domestic or foreign – are the indicated  
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sources.  User  charges  will  take  care  of  the  debt  servicing  and  the  operational  cost. 
Government  intervention  may  be  in  the  form  of  interference  with  price  setting  (such  as 
prescribing  an  internal  subsidisation  by  high-income  users  of  low-income  users). 
Conversely, the entities may attempt to obtain government loans or guarantees to reduce 
private-sector loan cost. Multilateral development finance may again be a supplementary 
source, whilst guarantees from an institution like the World Bank can play a role. 
￿  If  the  activity  is  the  responsibility  of  a  private  business  entity  (either  on  its  own  or  in 
partnership  with  a  government  agency),  loan  finance  may  be  complemented  by  equity 
finance.  Business  and  political  risk  may  again  prompt  the  seeking  of  government 
guarantees or the allowance of sufficiently large profit margins. The latter is a particularly 
thorny issue when a public monopoly is replaced by a private one and price sensitivity is 
great,  especially  when  there  are  a  large  number  of  low-income  users.  A  government’s 
inclination to regulate prices often results in the withdrawal or non-supply of private equity 
and even in a loss of private interest in running the business. The results of a study by 
Kirkpatrick, Parker and Zhang (2006: 143) indicate “that FDI in infrastructure responded 
positively to an effective domestic regulatory framework. By implication, where regulatory 
institutions are weak and vulnerable to ‘capture’ by the government (or the private sector), 
foreign  investors  may  be  more  reluctant  to  make  a  major  commitment  to  large  scale 
infrastructure projects in developing countries.” 
 
We  now  explain  the  different  options  with  reference  to  Table  3,  which  distinguishes  between 
incidence of cost (columns) and source of finance (rows). In each cell the underlying economic 
consideration is given in brackets at the end of the brief description of the financing and payment 
position. This classification is useful when we explore different financing options as case studies at 
the end of the paper. 
 
Table 3 
Paying for versus financing of infrastructure spending 
Who pays 
Tax payer  User  Donor 
 





  1  2  3  4 
Tax  payers 
(cash)  a 
Financed  and 
paid  for  by  tax 
payers  (as  if 
public 
consumption) 
Financed  by 
tax  payers; 
users  pay 
(benefit 
approach) 
Financed  by 
tax  payers; 




Financed  by 
tax  payers; 
donors  bear 
part of cost 
(distributional) 





(loans  or 
guarantees) 
b 
Loan  financed 
by  private 
investors;  tax 
payers  repay 
loans over time 
(intergenera-
tional  equity; 
allocative 
efficiency) 
Financed  by 
private 
investors; 












Financed  by 
private 
investors; 
sponsors  pay 
(subsidise  tax 










by  private 
investors;  tax 
payers  pay  to 








financed  by 
private 
investors; 
users  pay  to 








by  private 
investors; 
users  pay  and 
subsidise 
others to effect 




by  private 
investors; 
donors  pay 
(subsidise  tax 
payers  or 
users)  





Loan  finance 
by 
development 
agencies;  tax 
payers  pay  to 
effect  debt 
service 




users  pay  to 
effect  debt 
service 







Financed  and 





(grants)  e 
Grant  finance 
reduce  cost  to 
tax payers 
Grant finance 
reduce  cost 
to users 
Grant  finance 
reduce 
subsidisation 
by  users  to 
other users 
Grants  by 
sponsors 




The cost of infrastructure is ultimately borne by either tax payers, users or donors (columns 1,2, 3 
and 4). The responsibility, if not obligation, of tax payers remains important to the present day, long 
after Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations (1776) noted that “the duty of erecting and maintaining 
certain public works and certain public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any 
individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain” falls to the state, “because the 
profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may 
frequently do much more than repay it to a great society” (Smith, 1776: IV: 9.V.1.87)
3. 
If the nature of the facility is such that the benefits can be attributed to identifiable users (i.e. low 
external benefits of costs), user charges are indicated. If low-income users are to be subsidised, 
certain users will pay more than the benefit received in using the infrastructure (column 3). When 
donors  bear  part  of  the  cost  (column  4),  tax  payers,  users  or  a  subgroup  of  users  are  the 
beneficiaries. Of course, as with all transfer payments, the ability to substitute nonsubsidised goods 
or  tax  obligations  for  subsidised  goods  means  that  the  intended  beneficiaries  may  not  be  the 
eventual beneficiaries.
4 
A number of financing sources are available, as listed in the rows in Table 3. The infrastructure can 
be paid for in cash (row a), through the national, provincial or local budget (which represents the SA 
Government’s  current  position,  as  in  cell  1a).  Loan  finance  could  be  used  by  Government  or 
government business enterprises, the latter with or without government guarantees (row b). Loans 
can  be  in  the  form  of  bulk  lending  for  a  composite  set  of  projects  or  project  loans.  Private 
individuals or companies are the financiers. The investment plans of public enterprises typically fall 
in this category. Equity investment is another source of finance (row c): private business(es) buys a 
share (either as owners, co-owners or in partnership with government) in the activity, which needs 
to be properly structured for that purpose. Development agencies are another source of finance 
(row d). This normally entails cheaper loan finance either because the borrower receives the benefit 
of cheaper rates which the bulk lender can negotiate in the financial market, or because deliberate 
subsidisation is provided. In the latter case, some or other sponsor bears a portion of the cost of the 
infrastructure (as in cell 4d). Finally, donors can be a source of finance (row e), in which case 
grants reduce the cost to whoever has to pay for the infrastructure. 
 
Next we assess the merits and feasibility of the various options. We do not regard donor funds as a 
major source of finance for a planned long-term infrastructure expansion and therefore we focus 
only on the first four sources of finance in Table 3, namely, tax payers (government), lenders, 
equity investors and development agencies (which of course ultimately represent some tax payer or 
another or private philanthropist). 
 
Should loan finance be considered (row b in Table 3)? This brings us back to the question about 
the  appropriateness  of  South  Africa’s  budget  surplus,  which  appears  to  represent  a  tradeoff 
                                                       
3 Notation refers to Book IV, Chapter 9, Paragraph V.1.87 
4 See in this regard the standard fiscal literature on the effect of intergovernmental grants on the choice by the recipients 
between the consumption of subsidised public goods and consumption goods (i.e. tax reduction) (e.g. Rosen, 2005: 532-
536). By inference, the same analysis can be used to show that grant money to reduce the cost of infrastructural projects 
can distort relative prices and change the preferences of recipients in such a way that the actual benefit and its incidence 
may differ from what was intended.  
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between  growth  and  inflation.  There  is  an  implied  and  contestable  reasoning  that  government 
investment is dependent on government savings which plays in to the hands of those who believe 
that savings determine rather than respond to investment, sector by sector. The correction for the 
observed failures of deficit spending need not be that the government should only rely on its own 
savings to finance investment (i.e. running a current budget surplus equivalent to the amount of 
capital  expenditure).  Another  surplus-budget  argument  is  that  countries  in  which  nonrenewable 
resources are depleted should in this manner accumulate financial wealth (e.g. commensurate with 
the rate of depletion) to compensate future generations for the bequest of reduced natural wealth, 
as in the case of Chile. If this was a consideration in the justification of the surplus envisaged for 
the general government sector in 2007/08 and 2008/09 (see National Treasury, 2007: 49), at least 
it  was  not  revealed  as  such.  There  is  one  other  possible  explanation  for  the  planned  budget 
surplus,  namely  an  insurance  policy  against  an  over-optimistic  projection  of  the  enhanced 
economic growth that the ASGISA may generate. In other words, the fall-back position may well be 
to incur a growing budget deficit by default which, when it happens, will actually vindicate the view 
that considerations of macroeconomic stability provided such fiscal space. A proper disclosure up 
front of this contingency, which may well be the most acceptable of the above three explanations, 
would  certainly  benefit  fiscal  credibility.  Whatever  the  reason(s),  the  long  economic  lifespan  of 
infrastructure nonetheless justifies loan finance from the point of view of intergenerational equity 
and  allocative  efficiency,  a  microeconomic  argument  at  variance  with  the  Government’s 
macroeconomic stability considerations.  
 
However, even if the Government wishes to maintain a budget surplus, this need not close the door 
for loan finance. The more users rather than tax payers are to bear the cost (as in column 2) and 
the activity is structured and financed as a self-financing project outside the national, provincial or 
municipal budget, the more additional fiscal space will be created in the budget, whatever the target 
for  the  budget  balance.  Loan  financing  will  ensure  (better)  intergenerational  equity.  From  an 
efficiency  point  of  view,  this  benefit  approach  to  financing  the  facility  should  be  superior  to  a 
government  investment  programme  financed  from  consolidated  tax  revenue  and  run 
administratively and possibly without financial performance criteria. Already government enterprises 
operate in this manner (line b), but with intelligent project design more infrastructural facilities could 
be offered in this way (see the list of key areas in Table 2). Given that the benefits of infrastructural 
projects  at  local  and  even  provincial  government  level  are  often  geographically  confined,  such 
projects may be good candidates. Should distributional considerations require a subsidy to ensure 
affordability, this could be either tax financed (as in cell 1a, although tax payers will then only bear 
part of the cost) or paid for by higher-income users (i.e. cross-subsidisation within the group of 




Private investment does not mean that the investor bears the burden of the cost, unless  of course 
– in the case of equity investment – a loss is made. What is the likelihood of mobilising more 
domestic or foreign private investment, either in the form of loan or equity finance (rows 2 and 3)? 
This question has a bearing on both the investment by government business enterprises and the 
kind of “on-budget” projects alluded to in the previous paragraph. Already there are good examples, 
e.g. Aeroporti de Roma’s 20 per cent share in the Airport Company of South Africa (of which the SA 
Government owns 74.6%) and the investment of private consortiums in government infrastructure 
(via the Development Bank of Southern Africa) (see the section on development finance below). 
International experience has shown that business or project design, the regulatory environment and 
risk management are among the key success factors. What is the international experience? 
 
The review in recent times of the relative responsibilities of government and private business in the 
construction,  financing  and  operation  of  infrastructure  facilitated  a  major  transition  to  private 
participation in infrastructure, but the transition has not yet settled. The World Bank (2004: 154) 
points out that in many developing countries the agenda of market liberalisation, regulatory reform, 
and the restructuring of state-owned monopoly utilities remains unfinished. The Bank argues that, 
given the characteristics of certain infrastructure industries, including the huge sunk costs involved, 
elements of natural monopoly, and their political saliency, there remains a strong rationale for state 
intervention, even in cases where privatisation has been completed. In addition, investors have to  
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factor in ongoing transformations of the global infrastructure industry, such as how to accurately 
price and gauge demand for new products resulting from rapid technological change. 
 
From an investor’s point of view, the decision to invest in an infrastructure project depends on a 
number of considerations, such as: 
•  the respective rates of return, which vary with market conditions; 
•  the gearing  opportunities  which  depend  on  market  conditions  as  well  as  the  investment 
strategy of the prospective investor; 
•  the complementary business opportunities; 
•  the regulatory environment/framework; and 
•  the risk factor, which in addition to the standard risk elements, inevitably contains a political 
dimension  because  of  the  public-  or  quasi-public  goods  characteristics  of  infrastructure, 
especially  if  profit  margins  (and  prices)  become  suspect  under  conditions  of  ineffective 
competition. 
 
These considerations not only determine the decision to invest, but also the nature of investment, 
i.e. equity or loan investment and whether to invest in another country. The prospective investor’s 
interest in the particular sector (e.g. telecommunications or energy) or the particular country (if 
foreign investment is contemplated) then comes into play. 
 
After  World  War  II,  most  infrastructure  assets  were  vertically  and  horizontally  integrated  state 
monopolies under ministerial control (Kessides 2004: 1). However, since the early 1990s there has 
been  a  worldwide  change  in  how  infrastructure  should  be  owned,  organised  and  regulated. 
Alexander and Estache (1999: 2) point out that this change occurred because governments found 
that their own resources were insufficient to meet the growing infrastructure demands, they were 
under pressure to use their scarce resources for other government services such as welfare, and 
there was a belief that the private sector operators would bring about greater efficiency. To effect 
private  participation,  institutional  reforms  entailed  a  combination  of  competitive  restructuring, 
privatisation,  and  the  establishment  of  appropriate  regulatory  mechanisms  (Kessides  2004:  3). 
Since the mid 1980s South Africa underwent similar reforms, preparing the way for the gradual 
commercialisation and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, a process that is still underway. 
 
Estache (2004: 9) observes that during much of the 1990s infrastructure policies in developing 
countries were based on the assumption that financing was going to be rebalanced from its two 
traditional  sources  –  the  public  sector  (government  or  public  utilities)  and  official  development 
assistance – toward a third source: the private sector. The rebalancing did not go as far as many 
had hoped, particularly in the lowest-income countries and in the poorest regions of middle-income 
countries. During the 1990s the public sector financed 70 per cent, the private sector 20-25 per 
cent, and official development assistance 5-10 per cent of infrastructure spending, but these are 
rough estimates because the required data are not available. 
 
Internationally,  the  private  investment  experience  with  regard  to  infrastructure  has  been  rather 
varied. Da Silva, Estache and Järvelä (2006: 90-91) found evidence that debt has been replacing 
equity  in  the financing of  the  investment  needs  of  utilities  and transport services  in  developing 
countries. They found that leverage rates vary significantly across sectors, with the highest rates 
observed in transport and the lowest in water. One of the main motivations of the infrastructure 
privatisation wave of the 1990s was to obtain a significant contribution from the private sector to the 
financing  of  the  major  investment  needs  of  the  poorest  countries.  Reforms,  restructuring  and 
guarantees were generally aimed at maximising the access to private investment. A large number 
of developing countries did in fact introduce private participation into their infrastructure industries 
and, by the end of 2001, developing countries had received over $755 billion in private investment 
flows in nearly 2,500 infrastructure projects (World Bank, 2003: v). More specifically, this meant 
reorganising  the  sector  to  achieve  a  significant  equity  contribution  in  the  financing  of  the  new 
projects.  
 
Investment  commitments  peaked  in  1997  and  have  since  continued  to  drop.  The  2002  figures 
represented the lowest level of investment commitments in projects with private sector participation  
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since 1994.
5 This was accompanied by a significant reduction in the number of projects reaching 
financial  closure.  There  was  a  growing  concern  that  the  financing  structure  adopted  by  the 
operators may be increasingly switching from equity to private, mostly foreign, debt financing. Such 
a switch was likely to be difficult for two reasons. First, to developing countries debt finance can be 
more expensive than equity finance when the transaction costs associated with the effective short-
term nature of the bonds market in developing countries is accounted for. Second, every unit of 
foreign currency that enters into a country would be matched by a much larger proportion of debt 
contracted by the private operators. The public debt needed to finance the operations in the past 
would then be replaced by private debt rather than by private equity. Besides the obvious balance 
of payment consequences, this evolution in the financing structure of the sector raised significant 
issues from the strict viewpoint of regulation. Indeed, higher risks, higher cost of capital and hence 
higher tariffs are implied by two things: more expensive debt and operators more leveraged in 
foreign currency. 
 
Research on the experience with private finance of infrastructure concludes that the cost of doing 
business in developing countries is a key success factor. This outcome is consistent with the fact 
that  this  cost  has  been  much  higher  than  expected.  Estache  and  Pinglo  (2004)  document 
differences in the cost of capital across regions, arguing that some sectors and regions have not 
been and for a while will not be profitable for private investors.
6  
 
Unbundling  –  horizontally  and  vertically  –  is  another  key  requirement  for  privately  funded 
infrastructure projects. This could entail potentially competitive segments under separate ownership 
from natural monopoly components (Kessides 2004: 3). Kessides (2004: 3) list some examples: 
•  In  electricity,  transmission  and  distribution  services  should  be  unbundled  from  power 
generation. 
•  In telecommunications, long-distance, mobile and value added services should be split. 
•  In natural gas, transmission and distribution should be separated from production, supply 
and storage. 
•  In railroads, tracks, signals, and other fixed facilities should be split form train operations 
and maintenance 
 
According to Kessides (2004: 4), therefore, all infrastructure services should be privatised, except 
those  segments  where  natural  monopoly  conditions  persist  and  are  unavoidable  because  of 
substantial sunk capital. 
 
However, the question remains: If reform is so much more efficient and satisfactory than state-
owned monopolies, why the slow progress towards privatising publicly owned entities? Kessides 
(2004: 4) answers that even though the privatisation model conjures up many benefits and gains, it 
also poses significant risks if not accompanied by appropriate structural and regulatory safeguards. 
Whatever the model that may be appropriate in any country at any point in time, the fact that 
between 1990 and 2001 more than $750 billion was invested in 2500 private infrastructure projects 
in developing and transition economies, of which only 3 per cent went to Africa and the Middle East 
(Kessides 2004: 11), clearly indicates an under-utilisation of a significant financing source in South 
Africa’s part of the world. Incidentally, most of the $750 billion went into telecommunications and 
power infrastructure. 
 
South Africa’s opportunity to mobilise private capital for infrastructure may in a number of respects 
be more favourable than for many other developing countries in general. First, South Africa has 
relatively well developed financial markets in which bonds and shares are well traded and in which 
institutional  funds  present  an  important  source  of  finance.  Bond  financing  is  one  of  the  most 
profitable  and  appropriate  financing  options.  A  notable  current  development  which  should  be 
pursued in South Africa is the rapid expansion of international project bond markets, which provides 
developing  countries  with  wider  choices  in  bond  financing  (Kim,  2005:  8).  The  South  African 
                                                       
5 Subsequently, a strong cyclical recovery in global capital flows to developing countries occurred. Net private flows 
increased sharply in 2003, reaching $200 billion—their highest level since 1998. 
6 This is also the impression of Ramamurti and Doh (2004, as quoted by Estache, 2004: 10), who expect infrastructure-
related foreign direct investment to stabilise at lower levels.  
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municipal bond market has been in existence for many decades and now that the local government 
finance  is  steadily  being  put  on  a  better  footing,  the  rating-based  bond  issues  placed  by 
Johannesburg and Cape Town (the latter forthcoming at the time of writing) open new possibilities.  
 
Second, the government is a potential borrower of good standing, domestically and internationally,
7 
and  now  has  a  significant  borrowing  capacity  which  may  be  used  without  jeopardizing  fiscal 
sustainability. Of course, a budget surplus means that new loans will be unlikely, but the sovereign 
country rating benefits parastatals in the form of lower international debt cost.  
 
Thirdly, a programme of gradual and phased privatisation of public enterprises has for the past 20 
years  been  running  in  one  form  or  another,  which  entailed  private  equity  investment  and  the 
competitive  restructuring  of  the  relevant  economic  sectors.  Some  unresolved  issues  remain, 
however,  such  as  the  deregulation  of  Telkom  and  securing  the  financial  viability  of  the  public 
transport businesses (rail and air travel).  
 
Fourthly, public-private partnerships
8 have developed steadily over the past ten years as a method 
of partnering public and private institutions in delivering services of which the public- and private-
goods components are difficult to untangle in the operational and ownership sense of the word, 
such  as  water  supply  and  toll  roads.  Hence,  as  shown  in  Table  1,  the  private  finance  that  is 
envisaged  over  the  three-year  period  from  2007/08  onwards.  Despite  all  this,  the  fact  that  the 
investment surge in South African infrastructure occurs at a time when internationally private sector 
interest in this kind of investment appears to have waned, may well mean that the potential for 
private financing could be less than what other developing countries experienced during the past 
10-15 years.  
 
We maintain, however, that there are more opportunities for private investment in infrastructural 




The final source of finance that we explore is that of development agencies. Development finance 
comes  in  various  forms:  concessionary  finance  (so-called  soft  loans),  loan  guarantees  and 
conditional or unconditional grants. In essence, the purpose is to make the project more affordable 
on account of the agencies’ ability to raise funds in a beneficial manner and pass the benefit on to 
the users of the facility (as in row d of Table 3). The agency could also subsidise the project in such 
a way that its members contribute from their own resources, in which case they bear part of the 
cost (as  in  column  4  of  Table  3).  Development finance  increases fiscal  space,  ceteris  paribus, 
provided preferences recipient’s preferences are not distorted, which in practical terms means that 
governments should be wary of using donor money to finance projects that have not already been 
prioritised for normal budgetary funding. 
 
Chatterjee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky (2003, as quoted by Estache, 2004: 9) contrast the effects of a 
transfer tied to investment in public infrastructure with those of a traditional pure transfer. They 
show  that  pure  transfers  have  no  growth  or  dynamic  consequences  but  are  always  welfare 
improving.  That  is  not  the  case  for  transfers  tied  to  infrastructure,  where  long-run  growth  and 
welfare effects depend on the initial stock of infrastructure as well as cofinancing arrangements. 
                                                       
7 On 7 August 2005 it was announced that the credit rating agency Standard and Poor upgraded South Africa's long term 
foreign and local currency credit rating from BBB to BBB+ and from A to A+ respectively, citing South Africa's improved 
macro-economic stability.  
8 Heller (2005b: 13) sounds a warning about the perceived fiscal space created by PPPs. “Governments may believe that 
public-private partnerships constitute a mechanism for inducing the private sector to finance infrastructure investment that 
normal budgetary ceilings would limit. There may be some truth to this, particularly if the private sector is more efficient 
than the public sector in creating and operating infrastructure and public services. Such efficiency gains would imply 
some additional fiscal space; but for the most part, the savings on infrastructure expenditure will be offset in future years 
because  the  private  sector  would  naturally  build  in  the  cost  of  capital  into  the  leasing  costs  associated  with  the 
infrastructure. At a minimum, a government needs to ensure its capacity to absorb the higher expenditure costs in future 
years, and may need also to take account of the potential contingent risks that may arise in the case of the bankruptcy of 
the private sector agent.”  
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They also show that a temporary pure transfer has only modest short-run growth effects and leads 
to a permanent deterioration in the current account, while a productive (i.e. infrastructure related) 
transfer has significant impacts on short-run growth, leading to permanent improvements in key 
economic variables including the current account. 
 
What  has  been  the  recent  experience  with  regard  to  development  assistance  in  respect  of 
infrastructure? First we focus on foreign assistance, following which we briefly look at assistance 
originating inside the country. We observe a number of salient trends. 
 
Official  development  assistance  (ODA)  has  traditionally  been  the  second  largest  source  of 
infrastructure financing (Estache, 2004: 9), but this started to decline during the 1990s in the light of 
great expectations of a large contribution by the private sector. One gets a measure of the extent of 
this drop from the pattern of infrastructure commitments by multilateral development banks, which 
fell from $18.0 billion in 1996 to $13.5 billion in 1999, though by 2002 they had recovered to about 
$16.0 billion. According to Estache (2004: 9), even at its peak, such financing was too small relative 
to needs. 
 
Globally, the aid industry experiences increasing competition amongst a growing number of donors, 
with the World Bank Group having lost market share since the mid-1980s (Harford, Hadjimichael 
and  Klein,  2004:  3).  Internationally,  a  number  of  institutions  are  sources  of  development 
assistance.
9  Bilateral  creditors  and  donors  (from  member  countries  of  the  OECD  Development 
Assistance Committee), predominantly provide bilateral assistance, with most ODA programmes at 
the end of the 1990s having been responsible for more than 90 per cent in the form of grants (IDA, 
2002: 2). Aid dropped 5.1 per cent from US$106.8 billion in 2005 – a record high – to US$103.9 
billion in 2006, the first time a reduction was recorded since 1997. Aid to Africa
10 stalled, despite 
commitments made by the G8 to double aid to Africa by 2010.
11  
 
Multilateral institutions, notably the UN, the EU, Bretton Woods Institutions and other multilateral 
(regional)  development  banks  constitute  two  distinct  groups  in  terms  of  nature  of  financial 
assistance. The UN and the EU provide almost all of their assistance in the form of grants. By 
contrast,  IDA  (the  International  Development  Association  of  the World  Bank),  the  IMF  and  the 
regional development banks provide almost all of their support in the form of concessional lending. 
 
Total aid to sub-Saharan Africa from rich countries represents the bulk of reported net financial 
flows to the continent, accounting for between 40 per cent and 90 per cent in any given year since 
1970. While equity and foreign direct investments have grown significantly since the mid-1990s, 
they  are  highly  concentrated  in  a  small  number  of  countries.  For  most  countries,  official 
development assistance (ODA) is still the largest single source of capital inflows, contributing nearly 
half of all net capital flows. Per capita aid flows declined to $24 per capita in 1999 (nearly half the 
level seen in the late 1980s) but have since increased to about $37 per capita. (Sundberg and 
Gelb, 2006: 1-2). Non-special-purpose grants constitute what tax payers typically consider to be 
foreign aid: financing for education, infrastructure, and health projects, as well as budget support for 
general financing needs. Over time, this share of aid going to project and programme support has 
fallen.  In  per  capita  terms,  the  decline  in  project  and  programme  aid  during  the  1990s  was 
significant, and it has not yet recovered (Sundberg and Gelb 2006: 3). Less than 25 per cent of 
bilateral aid and 38 per cent of total aid (excluding debt relief) are provided as financing that can be 
directly used for projects and programmes to build infrastructure, educate children, or reduce the 
spread of infectious disease. (Sundberg and Gelb, 2006: 5).
12 
                                                       
9 For our purposes we exclude nongovernmental organizations, not regarding them as a significant source of financing of 
infrastructure. This does not rule them out as financiers of the occasional project. 
10 Between 1960 and 2004 nearly US$650 billion in aid was provided to sub-Saharan African countries by the OECD DAC 
countries (Sundberg and Gelb, 2006: 1).                     
11 As reported in DAC News, 4 April 2007. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/51/38348577.htm [accessed 7 
April 2007] 
12 Donor recipient countries themselves have nullified aspects of donor funding. In 25 countries in Africa, capital flight 
between 1970 and 1996 was estimated to total $193 billion compared with $178 billion in external debt, suggesting that 
several countries in Africa are, ironically, net creditors to rich countries (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2001, as quoted by 
Sundberg and Gelb, 2006: 7).  
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The main factor that determines the allocation of IDA resources among eligible countries is each 
country's  performance  in  implementing  policies  that  promote  economic  growth  and  poverty 
reduction. To link aid to these policies remains a daunting challenge in the light of empirical studies 
that offer only mild (and not uncontested) support for aid as boosting growth (Heller, 2005a: 2). 
Moreover, some aid such as in respect of investment in infrastructure, is only likely to show any 
growth benefits in the long term. Aid as a source of finance can also expose a country’s budget to 
significant volatility and unpredictability (Heller, 2005a: 3). South Africa does not appear on the list 
of countries qualifying for IDA assistance and can therefore not bargain on any financing from this 
source (IDA, 2006:1, click on IDA Resource Allocation Index). 
The  picture  is  different  with  regard  to  development  finance  in  the  form  of  loans,  because 
infrastructure financing constitutes an important part of World Bank business
13. South Africa has 
not,  however  been  a  major  beneficiary  in  recent  time.  Currently  six  projects  with  World  Bank 
finance are running, of which the committed funding is US$38m.
14 The Government’s (sometimes 
understandable) apprehension of World Bank conditionalities used to be an impediment, although 
the sensitivity may nowadays be less in the light of the country’s post-1994 good macroeconomic 
and fiscal track record. There is a wider window of opportunity, in fact, in that the World Bank has 
been working closely with the South African Treasury to prepare a Country Partnership Strategy 
(CPS) (World Bank 2006). The CPS sets out a framework for engagement with South Africa for 
2007-2010. It reflects, most importantly, South Africa's own development priorities as set out in 
ASGISA and South Africa’s unique position in the region. Two of the priority areas for World Bank 
engagement  are  urban  development  and  public  service  delivery,  both  of  which  link  to  public 
infrastructure. By its nature, any such financing will be project specific. 
 
What about the African Development Bank? Although South Africa has been a beneficiary of note
15 
and  project  finance  has  been  forthcoming,  for  example  in  2004,
16  it  did  not  directly  pertain  to 
infrastructure. Given the great development needs on the rest of the continent, the ADB is unlikely 
to be a significant source of development finance. Moreover, South Africa’s chances of mobilising 
development finance have been obstructed by the view in certain quarters of South Africa as a 
source  of,  rather  than  a  destination  for  development  finance.  Recently  this  position  has  been 
strengthened further by a discussion document released by the ruling ANC suggesting that the 
country sets aside between 0.2 and 0.5 per cent of its gross domestic product as development aid 
to  Africa.  The  existence  of  the  African  Infrastructure  Investment  Fund  (AIIF),  an  unlisted 
infrastructure  fund  targeting  equity  investments  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  sourcing  its  capital 
mainly from South
 African institutional investors
17 is another case in point.  
 
Strategically the country is likely to access more funds along the loan/equity route than seeking 
ODA. Given the developed nature of South Africa’s financial markets, sufficient reliable financial 
information  can  be  generated  to  ensure  that  projects  be  financed  with  high  financial  and 
socioeconomic  returns.  All  multilateral  and  most  bilateral  donors  use  cost-benefit  analysis  to 
estimate such returns. Among World Bank infrastructure projects that had at least 95 per cent of 
loan commitments disbursed between 1999 and 2003, the average economic return was 35 per 
cent, with a spread ranging from 19 per cent for water and sanitation projects to 43 per cent for 
transport (Estache, 2004: 4). It is imperative that South Africa approaches prospective donors with 
                                                       
13 A World Bank website (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS) search of infrastructure projects 
returns no less than 2600 results out of more than 9500 projects registered on their website, in which they were involved 
since 1947. 
14 As shown on the World Bank’s website [available at http://worldbank.org – accessed 11 May 2007]. 
15 Between 1967 and 2005 loans and grants to the amount of US$350,9 were made available to South Africa. See African 
Development Bank website, available at 
http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,969532&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL – accessed 11 May 2007. 
16 For a list of approved country projects financed by the African Development Bank in 2004 and 2005, see African 
Development Bank (2007). 
17 The AIIF was established in early 2004 as a joint venture between Macquarie Bank and Old Mutual Asset Managers of 
South Africa. In August 2004, AIIF had raised R 1 320 million from a range of leading South African institutional investors. 
AIIF is an unlisted infrastructure fund investing predominantly in South African infrastructure projects, including roads, 
airports, power, telecommunications, rail, ports, water and social infrastructure. Current investments include a 6% stake in 
Trans African Concessions (Pty) Limited, and a 10.2% stake in N3 Toll Concessions. (See “African infrastructure funds” 
available at http://www.macquarie.com.au/au/corporations/sfpc/saif/overview.htm [accessed 9 April 2007]).  
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proper  estimates  of  project  returns,  with  due  cognisance  of  demands  from  rivalry  countries. 
Projects  approved  on  the  basis  of  grant  funding  should  not  be  discarded,  but  aspects  of 
government  failure  as  well  as  donors’  own  interest  may  jeopardise  the  choice  of  projects  that 
enhance economic growth and underpin sustainable poverty reduction. 
 
The  Development  Bank  of  Southern  Africa  (DBSA)  is  an  important  domestic  source  of 
infrastructural  finance  (grantor,  lender,  investor  and  underwriter  of  guarantees):  its  declared 
purpose is to accelerate sustainable socio-economic development by funding physical, social and 
economic infrastructure within its mandated area of the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). The 2005/06 list of approved projects (DBSA, 2007) shows local governments to be the 
major client (which inter alia include a loan facility of R500m each for the city of Tshwane and the 
eThekwini Municipality and R600 million for the City of Cape Town for infrastructural development), 
with  educational  institutions  and  nongovernmental  organisations  also  featuring  occasionally.  An 
interesting  example  of  the  multifaceted  nature  of  their  support  is  the  financing  that  is  under 
negotiation in respect of the public-private partnership which the Department of Foreign Affairs is 
establishing to erect their new building. The DBSA offered a package which entails a combination 
of  a  technical  assistance  grant,  an  empowerment  equity  loan  funding  to  the  BEE  parties, 
performance bond counter guarantees to sub-contractor BEE shareholders, and a project financing 
loan to the private party as part of a syndicate of lenders arranged by a commercial bank. 
 
DBSA has aligned itself with the ASGISA investment drive, inter alia through the Local Investment 
Agency  created  in  partnership  with  Old  Mutual  and  a  targeted  infrastructure  development 
programme involving special development credits (DBSA, 2006: 15). Investments in human capital 
for planning, project management and technical capacity in municipalities are spearheaded by the 
Bank’s SiyenzaManje, in tandem with the Government’s Project Consolidate and the Infrastructure 
Delivery Improvement Programme (National Treasury, 2007: 131-132). If the financing levels of the 
past five  years  could  be  maintained  –  on  average  DBSA  approved  (loans  and  investments)  of 
R12,73 billion per annum over the five-year period 2001-2006
18 – the Bank will remain an important 
source  of  finance  especially  for  institutions  that  will  be  unable  to  directly  access  the  financial 
markets. 
 
Illustrating the combination of financing options: four case studies 
 
To illustrate the implementation of various financing options in South Africa, the finance structure of 
four infrastructure projects in South Africa is considered. Table 4, similar to Table 3, shows where 





















                                                       
18 Data obtained from the DBSA.  
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Table 4 
Paying for versus financing of infrastructure spending: four case studies 
Who pays 
Tax payer  User  Donor 
 
  As per benefit  Cross- 
subsidisation 
 
  1  2  3  4 
Gautrain  (only 
after 2011/12)  Gautrain (up to 
88%) 
  33%  of  Eskom 
expansion 
Tax  payers 
(cash)  a 
De Hoop (up to 
78%) 
De  Hoop  (up  to 
78% 
De  Hoop  (up  to 
78%) 
 
OR  Tambo 
(100%) 
Gautrain  (only 
after 2011/12) 
 
Medupi (66%)  Medupi (66%) 
Major part of 66% 
of  Eskom 
expansion 
Undisclosed 
(minor)  part  of 
66%  of  Eskom 
expansion 










Gautrain (up to 
88%) 
De  Hoop  (up  to 
78%) 
De  Hoop  (up  to 
78%) 
 
Gautrain (12%)  Private 
investors 
(equity) 
c   
De Hoop (22%) 









(grants)  e         
 
The purpose is to illustrate the spectrum of options already followed in South Africa and suggest 
that each and every prospective infrastructure project be systematically analysed with a view to the 
appropriate  combination  of  financing  and  payment  options.  It  is  particularly  important  that  the 
opportunity cost of equity gains in terms of efficiency loss be properly analysed and disclosed. It 
would also add a lot to public understanding of the implications of the prospective investment in 
South  African  infrastructure  if  the  National  Treasury  could  map  out  all  the  different  projects 
according to Table 4. 
 
OR Tambo International Airport 
 
The  Airports  Company  of  South  Africa  (ACSA),  owned  20  per  cent  by  the  Public  Investment 
Corporation  and  the  rest  by  government,  is  undertaking  numerous  projects  ahead  of  the  2010 
soccer World  Cup.  Most  of  these  developments  are  at  the  three  major  South  African  airports, 
Johannesburg (OR Thambo), Cape Town and Durban (King Shaka). Close to R4 billion is set aside 
for projects at OR Thambo, which includes a new central terminal building (of R2 billion), a new 
international pier (R535 million) and complementary Echo Apron (R219 million) and a new multi-
storey parkade (R470 million) that will provide 5200 additional parking bays (ACSA website). In 
total,  the  company  will  invest  up  to  R5.2  billion  in  new  and  upgraded  facilities  (ACSA,  2006), 
although this number has since inflated to R8.5 billion for the period up to 2013 (Lünsche, 2007a). 
 
To  finance  the  expansion  programmes,  ACSA  aims  to  issue  a  R12  billion  long-term  bond, 
structured in various tranches, with the first bond of R2 billion having been issued in April 2007 
(Lünsche, 2007a). The company has an upper-grade rating and its weighted average cost of capital 
is relatively inexpensive (Lünsche 2007a). To service the bond, ACSA will rely on its tariff income 
which  is  earned  through  a  percentage  of  the  airport  tax  and  landing  fees.  This  locates  this 
programme  in  cell  b2  of  Table  4.  These  tariffs  comprise  55  per  cent  of  ACSA’s  total  revenue 
(ACSA,  2006),  the  major  other  revenue  sources  being  retail  rentals  (18%),  advertising  (5,6%),  
parking (10,8%), and car hire (5,2%) (ACSA, 2006). ACSA is budgeting for an 8.5 per cent  rise in 
tariff  income  in  the  2007/2008  financial  year  (Lünsche,  2007a),  implying  that,  given  expected 
inflation, the airport use is becoming relatively more expensive. 
 
ACSA is almost an atypical example of a parastatal infrastructure provider. The company is earning 
profits, puts a high emphasis on maintenance and plans well in advance (even though it may have 
underestimated the growth in passengers).
19 Moreover, its financing option of long-term borrowing 
and debt servicing through user charges complies with efficiency considerations. OR Tambo Airport 
is therefore located in cell b2. 
 
One reason for the good performance may be that ACSA has no responsibility to increase airport 
use on equity grounds; whereas most other infrastructure indicators must reflect the access of its 
services  to  the  poor,  ACSA  is  under  no  obligation  to  “make  airport  use  available  to  all”.  This 
ensures  that  it  is  the  customers  who  end  up  paying  for  the  improvements  and  expansions  at 
airports through tariffs on plane tickets. Furthermore, by issuing bonds, ACSA is also ensuring that 
tomorrow’s customers ultimately pay for a service they will receive, while current customers are not 
burdened with high tariffs that they ultimately will not enjoy the services of. With little or no cross-
subsidisation,  between  higher  and  lower  income  users  or  today’s  consumers  and  tomorrow’s 
consumers, ACSA is a good example of the allocative efficiency created by the benefit principle at 
work. 
 
Gautrain Rapid Rail Link 
 
The R25,1 billion Gautrain Rapid Rail Link is an 80km mass-transit system in Gauteng that will 
ultimately link Johannesburg, Pretoria and the OR Tambo International Airport. The project has 
been structured as a public-private partnership, with Bombardier Transportation (25%), Bouygues 
Travaux Public (25%), Murray & Roberts (25%), and SPG (25%) as shareholders in the Bombela 
Concession Company. 
 
According to the Gauteng Finance Minister’s 2007 Budget Speech, the public sector has committed 
R22  billion  to  the  project,  with  the  contribution  of the  private  sector  set  at  R3  billion  (Gauteng 
Provincial  Government,  2007).  The  private  contribution  is  financed  through  loans  from  a  joint 
agreement between Bombela Concession Company and First National Bank and Standard Bank. 
Furthermore,  SPG  (Strategic  Partners  Group),  a  broad  based  black  economic  empowerment 
company,  is  funded  by  the  Industrial  Development  Corporation  and  the  Development  Bank  of 
Southern Africa. According to Olivier (2007), “the two development finance institutions had agreed 
to provide SPG with a performance bond in the amount of R220-million and a loan facility worth 
R196-million, which is intended to assist SPG in its acquisition of equity in Bombela”. 
 
According to the National Budget (National Treasury, 2007), the national and provincial government 
will each contribute R8.8 billion over the Medium Term Expenditure Framework period, and the 
private  sector  contribution  will  amount  to  R2.1  billion.  Between  2006/2007  and  2011/2012  the 
project cost will total R22.6 billion. According to the National Budget (National Treasury, 2007: 59), 
after  2011/12  the  project  will  move  into  the  operational  phase  and  costs  will  be  covered  by 
operating revenue. This suggests that the initial R22.6 billion will not be financed through future 
user charge repayments, with taxpayers, therefore, bearing the brunt of design and construction 
costs. There is no indication that government borrowing will increase and to which degree future 
taxpayers will supplant current taxpayers in financing the Gautrain project. The private partners 
would only invest if by their estimation an appropriate return is obtained. Such revenue will be in the 
form  of  user-charges,  with  no  or  little  projected  cross-subsidisation.
20  We  therefore  locate  the 
financing-payment of this project in five different cells: a1 and b1 (because up to 88% of project 
cost will be financed by government through current or future taxes), c2 (because 12% of project 
                                                       
19 The 2006 SAICE report card, published by the South African Institute of Civil Engineers, gives ACSA a very good “B” 
rating, emphasising that “the key factor pertinent to the state of ACSA's infrastructure has been its strong financial state, 
and in particular its ability over the years to budget adequately for maintenance and replacement” (SAICE, 2006). 
20 While donor funding and loan facilities do play a role within the Bombela consortium, their main aim is to act as platform 
for the development of BBBEE agents and therefore should not be included as part of this analysis.  
cost will be financed through private investment), and a2 and b2 (because only after 2011/2012 will 
user charges pay for management and operation). 
 
Of course, the envisaged public spending could be justified if the government believes that there 
are positive externalities that accrue from the investment in the Gautrain project. This is possible 
through the direct and indirect positive impact infrastructure investment has on economic growth. 
Yet, these benefits will only accrue in the long-run with future taxpayers to benefit. This suggests 
that loan finance would be more appropriate than the R16 billion to be financed from current tax 
revenue, which would locate the programme in cell b1. 
 
Eskom expansion programme 
 
Eskom, a South African electricity public utility, aims to spend more than R150 billion over the next 
five  years  to  increase  its  electricity  generation  capacity  and  improve  transmission  and  its 
distribution  network.  Their  underestimation  of  the  South  African  economic  growth  has  created 
shortages in electricity supply with consequent power-outages in a number of provinces. This is 
due not only to the stagnant level of electricity generation, but also the deteriorating condition of 
transmission and distribution networks. 
 
During May 2007, Eskom received the go-ahead for the construction of the first coal-fired power 
plant in nearly two decades, in Lephalale, Limpopo. The power plant, named Medupi, is set to 
commence operation in 2011 and will eventually add 4500 MW (11.5% of current capacity and 
7.4% of projected capacity) to the electricity network. The projected construction cost is R66 billion 




According to  Lünsche (2007b),  Eskom  will  finance  the  R150  billion  capital  expenditure  through 
South African and offshore debt markets (R100 billion) and the remaining from Eskom’s cash flow 
(which  is  projected  to  increase  with  proposed  higher  tariffs  in  2008  and  2009).  According  to 
Eskom’s finance director, two-thirds of the borrowings will be raised on the South African bond 
market, with the offshore borrowing programming comprising export credit financing and foreign 
debt (Lünsche, 2007b: 18). 
 
Eskom is gearing up to expand its generation capacity at a rapid pace. The increase in capital 
expenditure is to be financed mostly through debt financing, both on the South African bond market 
and offshore. This debt will be serviced by an increase in tariffs for future users of electricity, which 
complies  with  criteria  of  efficiency.  However,  Eskom  is  also  obliged  to  ensure  that  access  to 
electricity improves, as there are especially rural areas with no electricity supply and assuming that 
marginal  cost  pricing  would  be  unaffordable.  This  will  probably  ensure  some  degree  of  cross-
subsidisation. The extent is unknown. The project is thus located in cells a2, b2 and c2. 
 
De Hoop dam 
 
De Hoop is a R7.9 billion dam and water reticulation project undertaken by the Department of 
Water  Affairs  and  Forestry.  The  dam  will  enable  the  development  of  the  rural  communities 
surrounding the dam, deliver water to Mokopane and surrounding platinum mines, enable Eskom to 
consider a hydro plant, and facilitate the development of Burgersfort (Schneider, 2007: 50). Water 
is  considered  a  resource  for  mining  industries  in  the  Limpopo  province,  and  with  current  dam 
capacity  on  average  at 59  per  cent,  the  availability  of  a  dependable  water  source  could  spark 
investor interest (Hill, 2007). 
 
According to Schneider (2007: 50), construction of the dam will cost government R1.2 billion, with 
groundwork having started in March 2007. Government is also responsible for the bulk raw water 
distribution  network  at  an  additional  R3.7  billion  (phase  2),  with  municipalities  responsible  for 
another R3 billion to construct pump stations, water treatment plants, pipelines and reservoirs for 
                                                       
21 Only 20% of the R150 billion capital expenditure programme is devoted to investments in Medupi and Project Bravo 
(Lünsche, 2007a).  
potable  water  (Schneider  2007:  50).  According  to  Schneider  (2007:  50),  mining  houses  will 
contribute roughly 47 per cent of the capital costs of phase 2, calculated as a percentage of the 
water they use from the dam, which equals R1.74 billion (22%) of the total bill of R7.9 billion. 
 
It is unclear how the government (both the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and the local 
municipalities) will finance the capital expenditure. Conjecture suggests that most of it will probably 
be through current expenditure i.e. through the general revenue fund of national government and 
user charges with cross-subsidisation at local municipality level. The De Hoop dam is thus located 
in cells a1, a2, b2 and c2. Again, there is no clear economic justification for current taxpayers to 




In this paper we presented a range of financing and payment options that could be considered with 
respect  to  the  SA  Government’s  infrastructure  investment  plans.  We  suggested  that  the  wider 
application  of  the  benefit  principle  of  allocative  efficiency  should  increase  the  fiscal  scope  at 
national level. We have developed a classification system that enables a systematic mapping of all 
the  prospective  projects  that  should  aid  the  macro  planning  and  assist  in  any  analysis  of  the 




ACSA  (Airports  Company  of  South  Africa).  (2006).  Annual  Report.  Available  online: 
http://www.acsa.co.za/home.asp?pid=517 [accessed 9 July 2007]. 
 
_____. (2007). Projects. Available online: http://www.acsa.co.za/home.asp?pid=2781# [accessed 9 
July 2007]. 
 
African  Development  Bank.  (2007).  ADB  Projects.  Available  at 
http://www.afdb.org/portal/page?_pageid=473,1050321&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
[accessed11 May 2007]. 
 
Alexander, I and Estache, A. (1999). Infrastructure Restructuring and Regulation – Building a base 





Black, PA, Calitz, E, Steenekamp, TJ and Associates. (2005). Public Economics. 3rd edition. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press. 
 
Boyce, J and Ndikumana, L. (2001). Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimates of Capital Flight from 
Severely  Indebted  Sub-Saharan  African  Countries,  1970–1996.  Journal  of  Development 
Studies 38 (Dec):27–56. 
 
Calitz,  E  and  Siebrits,  FK.  (2005).  Fiscal  Policy.  In  PA  Black,  E  Calitz.  TJ  Steenekamp  & 
Associates. Public Economics. 3rd edition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press: 238-271. 
 
Chatterjee, S, Sakoulis, G and Turnovsky, S. (2003). Unilateral Capital Transfers, Public 
Investment, and Economic Growth. European Economic Review 47 (6): 1077-1103. 
 
Creamer, T. All systems go for R66bn coal-fired power station build, SA's first in two decades. 
Engineering  News.  8  May  2007.  Available  online: 
http://www.miningweekly.co.za/article.php?a_id=108490 [accessed 10 July 2007]. 
 
Da Silva LC, Estache A and Järvelä S. (2006). Is debt replacing equity in regulated privatized 
infrastructure in LDCs? Utilities Policy 14 (2006) 90-102. Available at www.sciencedirect.com 
[accessed 9 April 2007]. 
  
DBSA (Development Bank of Southern Africa). (2007). Annual Report 2005/06. 
 
Estache, A. (2004). A Selected Survey of Recent Economic Literature on Emerging Infrastructure 
Policy  Issues  in  Developing  Countries.  Unpublished  working  paper. Washington,  DC: World 
Bank. 
 
Estache, A. and Pinglo, ME. (2004). Are returns to Public-Private Infrastructure Partnerships in 
Developing Countries Consistent with Risks since the Asian Crisis. World Bank, PR Working 
Paper series Number 3373. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Gauteng  Provincial  Government.  (2007).  Budget  Speech  2007.  Available  online: 
http://www.finance.gpg.gov.za/budget%20speech.pdf [accessed 9 July 2007]. 
 
Harford, T, Hadjimichael, B and Klein, M. (2004). Aid Agency Competition. Public Policy Journal 
277 (October). World Bank. Available at  h t t p : / / r r u . w o r l d b a n k . o r g / P u b l i c P o l i 
c y J o u r n a l [ [accessed 7 April 2007]. 
 
Heller, P. (2005a). Making AID work. Finance and Development 42(3): 11 pages. Available at h t t p 
: / / r r u . w o r l d b a n k . o r g / P u b l i c P o l i c y J o u r n a l [accessed 7 April 2007].  
 
_____. (2005b). Understanding Fiscal Space. IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/05/4. Washington, 
DC: IMF. March.  
 
Hill,  M.  (2007).  R5bn  De  Hoop  dam  to  be  development  'catalyst'.  Engineering  News.  Available 
online: http://www.miningweekly.co.za/article.php?a_id=105962 [accessed 10 July 2007]. 
 
IDA  (International  Development  Association).  (2002).  IDA,  Grants  and  the  Structure  of  Official 
Development Assistance.  
 
_____.  (2006).  How  IDA  Resources  are  Allocated.  Available  at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:20052347~m
enuPK:2607525~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html  [accessed  9  April 
2007].  
 
Kessides, I. (2004). Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and Competition. A World 
Bank Policy Research Report. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Kim, Y-H. (2005). Financing Infrastructure Development: Asian Developing Countries Need to Tap 
Bond Markets More Rigorously. ERD Policy Brief no. 34. Asian Development Bank. February.  
 
Kirkpatrick,  C,  Parker, D  and  Zhang,  Y-F.  (2006).  Foreign  direct  investment  in  infrastructure in 
developing countries: does regulation make a difference? Transnational Corporations 15(1):143-
171. April.  
 
Lünsche,  S.  (2007a).  Prepare  for  a  comfy  landing.  Supplement  to  the  Financial  Mail.  Special 
Report: Infrastructure. June 22 2007, pp. 48. 
 
Lünsche, S. (2007b). Keeping up, powering on. Supplement to the Financial Mail. Special Report: 
Infrastructure. June 22 2007, pp. 16-18. 
 
National Treasury. (2007). National Budget Review. National Treasury: Pretoria. 
 
Olivier, M. (2007). Gautrain consortium secures R3bn loan. Engineering News. Available online: 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article.php?a_id=100763 [accessed 9 July 2007]. 
 
Rosen, Harvey S. (2005). Public Finance. 7th edition. Singapore: McGraw-Hill. 
 
RSA. (2006).  Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA). Available on  
line: http://www.info.gov.za/asgisa/asgisa.htm [accessed 30 July 2007]. 
 
SAICE (South African Institution of Civil Engineering). 2006. The SAICE Infrastructure Report Card 
for South Africa: 2006. Available online: http://www.civils.org.za/ [Accessed 14 June 2007]. 
 
Schneider,  M.  (2007).  Floods  of  investment.  Supplement  to  the  Financial  Mail.  Special  Report: 
Infrastructure. June 22 2007, p. 50. 
 
Siebrits, FK and Calitz, E. (2004). Should South Africa adopt numerical fiscal rules?. South African 
Journal of Economics 72(4):759-782. 
 
Smith, Adam. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 2 Vols, 
Everyman’s Library. London: Dent & Sons (1904). 
 
SUDEO International Business Consultants. (2007). Draft Research Report for the 
Infrastructure  Inputs  Sector  Strategy.  Commissioned  by  The  Presidency,  Republic  of  South 
Africa. Pretoria: The Presidency. 
 
Sundberg, M and Gelb, A. (2006). Making Aid Work. Finance and Development 43(4): 10 pages. 
Available  at  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/12/sundberg.htmhttp://www.imf. 
org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/12/sundberg.htm [accessed 7 April 2007].  
 
World Bank. (2003). Private Participation in Infrastructure: Trends in Developing Countries, 1990 – 
2001. Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility.  
 
________.  (2004).  Global  Development  Finance:  Harnessing  Cyclical  Gains  for  Development. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at www.worldbank.org.  
 
________. (2006). South Africa Country Brief. Washington, DC: World Bank. November. Available 
at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SOUTHAFRICAEXTN
/0,,menuPK:368086~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:368057,00.html  [accessed  24 
April 2007]. 
 